obfuscation as default
elof2 at sentor.se
elof2 at sentor.se
Thu Jan 19 05:09:26 EST 2012
I too think that the stderr output is unneccessary. Once documented
there's no need for it.
This line in the documentation below is backwards, isn't it?
# Commandline equivalent: -x
I think it should read:
# Commandline override: -x
/Elof
On Wed, 18 Jan 2012, Carter Bullard wrote:
> OK, so taking Mark's suggestion, I added a configuration option to rarc
> that describes the behavior, and gives a switch to conveniently turn it off.
> We've now got manpage cover on the -x switch, and "ra -h" will print out
> the -x option.
>
> # When printing user data in Ascii, there are some protocols where
> # argus may have captured plaintext passwords, such as telnet and
> # pop email. As a precaution, ra* programs will attempt to avoid
> # printing plaintext passwords in the output. When this option is
> # enabled, plaintext after the string 'PASS ' will be over-written
> # with 'x'.
> #
> # Commandline equivalent: -x
> #
> #RA_OBFUSCATE_PASSWORDS=yes
>
> So I'd like to leave the current default behavior, and use -x to turn it off.
> Is this going to get closer to solving any issues?
>
> Carter
>
>
> On Jan 18, 2012, at 7:03 PM, John Gerth wrote:
>
>> Elof's logic is sound. I'm for keeping obfuscation as the default
>> and if the documentation is updated, I'm not sure how much
>> emitting a message on stderr is worth.
>>
>> Just my 2 cents....not trying to muddy the obfuscation waters,
>> /J
>>
>> On 1/18/12 3:58 PM, Carter Bullard wrote:
>>> OK, the count is now 2 - 2. The issue is valid, that we should not set
>>> incorrect expectations. We could print a warning to stderr, that ra.1
>>> obfuscated content?
>>>
>>> Carter
>>>
>>>
>>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 6:21 AM, elof2 at sentor.se wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> First I thought like CS Lee, that it was backwards to obfuscate without asking for it on the commandline. That's why I reported it to the list in the first place.
>>>>
>>>> Though, once Carter explained that the default was to obfuscate, to protect and prevent from accidental copy and paste of sensitive data into e.g. an email, I changed my mind.
>>>> That is a cheap and simple protection from human mistakes that can get really embarrising/awkward if one paste the wrong data to e.g. a mailinglist.
>>>>
>>>> So I vote for the Carter approach. Obfuscate in the clients by default and use -x to reveal the real data.
>>>>
>>>> The real problem is that this was an undocumented feature. Once it's a known default (the new man pages), I only see benefits with the default obfuscation.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Regarding that there are sensitive data in the binary argus file... It contain so much sensitive data that I always treat it as highly sensitive.
>>>> I would think three or four times before sending an argus-logfile to e.g. a mailinglist, while a simple copy and paste of some ra output could possibly slip by.
>>>>
>>>> /Elof
>>>>
>>>>
>>
>>
>
>
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