[AGL] What goes round goes round
Byron Allen Black
englishcorrection at gmail.com
Sat Jan 4 00:05:55 EST 2014
Hey TB.
Surprised you don't know of David Irving - just about the most
controversial guy in the western world. German speaker, done incredible
research with surviving Nazis on the 3rd Retch. His book on Mr. Hilter is
quite something too.
He's been in plenty of hot water as an alleged "holocaust denier" which can
mean anything from "Please Mr. Zionist stop twisting my arm" to "Of course
they were showers! The stuff you hear is all a hoax!"
I think he's even gone to jail for contravening some of the denier laws in
the EU.
The book is "Goering". It's a free download so I don't feel bad about
attaching it.
On 4 January 2014 03:27, TeleBob <telebob at gmail.com> wrote:
> Fascinating stuff Byron. From whence does this history emerge? I don't
> know the book... I guess I can look it up.... Amazon carries?
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 3, 2014 at 12:59 PM, Byron Allen Black <
> englishcorrection at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Reading David Irving's excellent biography of Reichsmarschall Hermann
>> Goering. Turns out ole Hermann had his own version of a [lo-tech] NSA.
>> Eerily familiar:
>>
>> a ‘nazi nsa’ – from david irving’s göring biography
>>
>>
>>
>> It will be appropriate at this point to contemplate Göring’s other finely
>> sinewed and highly intelligent animal, his Forschungsamt (literally,
>> Research Office). Created on April 10, 1933, the Forschungsamt (FA) was
>> perhaps the least known, but most significant, of all his agencies. Its
>> role in entrenching his position in Hitler’s power structure, surrounded by
>> increasingly envious
>>
>> enemies, was considerable; and its extraordinary output over the next
>> twelve years – nearly half a million reports, coyly termed “research
>> results,” on intercepted telephone conversations and
>>
>> deciphered signals – would affect the political history of the Reich.
>>
>>
>>
>> Small wonder that Göring jealously guarded access to this agency. He had,
>> like Hitler, a healthy contempt for the other Nazi intelligence-gathering
>> agencies like the Abwehr. (He once said, correctly, that Admiral Wilhelm
>> Canaris and his “boatload of pirates” had contributed nothing.) With the
>> possible exception of the Foreign Ministry’s code-breaking section
>> (Pers-Z), Göring’s FA was unquestionably Hitler’s best general intelligence
>> agency, with cryptanalytical sources ranging from the Vatican to
>> Switzerland. Thus the FA read the cipher of the U.S. legation in
>>
>> Berne continuously until 1942, when one of his Prussian officials, the
>> traitor Hans-Bernd Gisevius, sold the information to the U.S. government
>> and the leak was plugged. Instinctively neither Hitler nor Göring trusted
>> human agents. When military code-breakers Gottfried Schapper and Georg
>> Schröder had first proposed a “Reich Intelligence Agency,” Hitler had
>> turned the project over to Göring, stipulating only that the agency was to
>> make no use of agents, but to
>>
>> rely exclusively on what is today called signals intelligence
>> (wiretapping and cryptanalysis). This was clear evidence of the trust that
>> he reposed in Göring: It was like the absolute trust a blind man must have
>> in his guide dog. Funded initially by Göring’s Prussian state government,
>> the harmless-sounding Forschungsamt began with four code-breakers, expanded
>> to twenty by July 1933, and employed thirty-five hundred or more,
>> operating throughout Germany and the occupied countries, over the next
>> twelve years. Its senior officials were dedicated Nazis, and only one FA
>> employee – Oberregierungsrat Hartmut Plaas, a close friend of Canaris
>> and the former adjutant of Freikorps Commander Ehrhardt – was caught
>> leaking FA secrets (he was shot).
>>
>>
>>
>> Soon after it was set up, Göring handed over general supervision of the
>> Forschungsamt to Paul Körner. Körner approved its budget and staff appointments.
>> When the FA moved into its first cryptanalytical workshop, in an attic
>> in Behren Strasse in the heart of the government district, the FA chief was
>> Hans Schimpf, a quiet navy lieutenant commander who had until recently been
>> attached to the army’s code office.
>>
>>
>>
>> All except Schimpf survived the coming war, but after the surrender they
>> lay low, scared of being treated as Nazi agents. They volunteered little
>> information, and the records of that era
>>
>> vanished. Scattered around the world, however, are a few items that
>> clearly betray FA provenance, and they show beyond a doubt that it was one
>> of the most efficient and accurate intelligence-gathering agencies of
>> its time, its integrity guaranteed by the rigid civil-service standards
>> imposed on its staff and by the extraordinary character of Hermann
>> Göring as its ultimate master.
>>
>>
>>
>> Hitler had granted to him the absolute Reich monopoly on wiretapping.
>> Göring protected this monopoly fiercely. A big “G” scrawled at the foot
>> of a warrant, forwarded to him by Pili
>>
>> Körner, would suffice for the tap to be applied. But that “G” was not
>> easily attained, and he gave Himmler’s Gestapo a particularly hard time.
>> “If,” recalled one FA official, “as was usually the
>>
>> case with the Gestapo’s applications, the reason given for the wiretap
>> was too vague, then the minister Göring simply disallowed it; and if he did
>> permit it, he forbade any results to be
>>
>> forwarded [to the Gestapo] until he had given his express authority in
>> each case.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Walter Seifert, head of the FA’s evaluation section, who had joined
>> straight out of Jüterbog Signals School in August 1936, would recall
>> that Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Gestapo
>>
>> under Himmler, hated having to submit every wiretap application to
>> Göring. “But without that ‘G’ on it I wasn’t allowed to order the tap.”
>> Over the years he and Himmler would advance
>>
>> every possible argument for taking over the Forschungsamt. The Führer
>> merely told them to take it up with Göring.
>>
>>
>>
>> The first chief, Schimpf, lasted only two years. A cheerful womanizer,
>> he became amorously entangled with a lady in Breslau; he solved the matter
>> by shooting her and then (being a
>>
>> gentleman) himself on April 10, 1935. Göring appointed Prince Christoph
>> of Hesse (Born in 1901, he had married Sophie Battenberg, one of the six
>> German sisters of the present duke of Edinburgh (who fought against the
>> Germans in WWII), and he retained this top Nazi intelligence job for the
>> next eight years.
>>
>>
>>
>> During Göring’s regime, the Forschungsamt moved into magnificent new
>> premises in Berlin’s Charlottenburg district. Housed in a sprawling complex
>> of former residential buildings set discreetly back from Schiller Strasse,
>> near what Berliners call “the Knee,” the hundreds of specially sworn officials
>> and language specialists sat at their equipment in halls patrolled by
>>
>> armed guards and subject to the most stringent security regulations.
>>
>>
>>
>> Every scrap of paper, from the duplicate pads used by the telephone
>> monitors to the brown paper of the “research results,” was number-stamped
>> and logged. Recipients of the Brown Pages signed oaths of secrecy
>> subjecting them to the death penalty in the event of violation. The Brown
>> Pages were conveyed only in red double-thickness envelopes inside locked
>> pouches or pneumatic-mail canisters; handled only by special FA couriers;
>> signed for in triplicate by their authorized recipients. (Milch signed for
>> his new pouch key on April 27, 1936, promising “in the event of loss to
>> notify the FA immediately and pay all costs for the replacement of the
>> pouch.”)
>>
>>
>>
>> “The work of the FA,” warned Prince Christoph, who had the rank of
>> Ministerialdirektor in Göring’s Prussian Ministry, “will have both point
>> and profit only if its secrecy is safeguarded by every possible means.
>> Inadequate security will result in the enemy,” whom these February 1938 security
>> regulations did not identify, “taking precautions, and our sources drying
>> up.” Thus the “results” were never to be explicitly referred to in
>> documents, nor discussed by phone except on the special secure telephone
>> network installed by the FA throughout the government district, or on the
>> secure teleprinter system. Recipients, regardless of rank, had to return
>> each and every Brown Page intact to the FA. Even Hitler had to toe this
>> line. FA chief Gottfried Schapper wrote to Hitler’s adjutant Paul Wernicke
>> in May 1938 peremptorily demanding the return of seven numbered
>> “results” delivered to the Führer on the day that German troops entered
>> Austria.
>>
>>
>>
>> By 1937 the FA had grown so costly that Göring switched it to the budget
>> of his Air Ministry, where secrecy was easier. As camouflage, all FA officials
>> now wore air-force uniforms. The FA
>>
>> maintained five hundred wiretaps around the clock in Berlin alone,
>> primarily on foreign embassies, legations, journalists, and suspected
>> enemies of the Reich. The Charlottenburg rooms were divided into “regions” (
>> *Bereiche*) – one each for English, American, Italian, Portuguese,
>> Dutch, Polish, Czech, and the other languages of the moment. Dr. Gerhard
>> Neuenhoff, one linguist who was assigned to the French (and Belgian)
>> “region” on September 15, 1936, found himself just one of a thousand
>> other specialists, strictly limited in their mobility in the FA complex: He
>> was never allowed up to the top floor, where Section IV’s codebreakers
>>
>> were at work with the Hollerith punched-card computers and the other
>> tools of their trade.
>>
>>
>>
>> Neuenhoff was set in front of a standard hotel-type switchboard,
>> monitoring forty lines including the Belgian legation, the French military
>> attaché, and French correspondents in Berlin. He soon learned to recognize
>> who was speaking – the French ambassador André François-Poncet, with his
>> slow, pedantic enunciation, or the French journalist Madame Tabuis, with
>> her shrill tones.
>>
>>
>>
>> It is important to accept that these FA monitors were incorruptible civil
>> servants, with neither the means nor the motive to falsify “results.” They
>> jotted down what they heard on paginated
>>
>> duplicate pads, in longhand, or recorded it on wire recorders; tossed the
>> completed note, already headed “State Secret” (*Geheime Reichssache*)
>> onto a conveyor belt; within minutes it was typed up, evaluated,
>> cross-indexed, and issued – either by FA dispatch rider or vacuumed with
>> the speed of a rifle bullet through Berlin’s pneumatic-mail system into
>> the very anteroom of the authorized minister or his Staatssekretär. Each
>> canister had its own address code on it – three narrow rings in blue
>> guided it, for example, to Milch’s private office at the secret Air
>> Ministry building.
>>
>>
>>
>> The Forschungsamt gave Göring an edge over every rival contender for
>> power in Germany. Not one international cable crossed Reich territory or
>> its adjacent waters without being tapped by the FA. There were FA field
>> units in every amplifier station. Fifty synchronous teleprinters
>> installed in the cavernous basement at Charlottenburg churned out “results”
>> twenty-four hours a day.
>>
>>
>>
>> Göring’s SigInt specialists “looped into” the great Indo-Cable that
>> carried all London’s telegraphic traffic with India. (“At first,”
>> recalled FA specialist Walter Seifert, “that was
>>
>> quite bountiful.”) The cable from Paris, France, to Tallin, Estonia,
>> navigated the Baltic Sea; Göring’s frogmen tapped that, and of course the
>> landlines between Vienna, Prague, Moscow, and
>>
>> London – all of which crisscrossed Reich territory.
>>
>>
>>
>> The biggest customers for the Brown Pages were Hitler’s new Propaganda
>> Ministry and the Ministry of Economics. An intercept of any story being
>> filed by a foreign correspondent in
>>
>> Germany enabled Goebbels to plant an immediate reply in rival foreign
>> newspapers overnight. The FA could also supply inside economic information
>> with a speed and reliability that assisted
>>
>> Göring and the Reich to make dramatic “kills.” Seifert’s evaluation
>> section built up a card index of names and subjects; his subsection 12-C
>> kept tabs on every spoken or enciphered reference
>>
>> to vital raw materials like rubber, nonferrous metals, wood, and
>> newsprint. Göring’s secret agency made him an expert in everything from
>> international egg prices to the yield of low-grade
>>
>> iron ores. He had laid down two rules: He was to be supplied
>> automatically with copies of everything; and all FA intercepts of his
>> conversations were to be drawn to his attention to enable him to check his
>> own phone security. Surviving data shows that he used the system well, as a
>> routine check on the Reich’s ponderous and inefficient bureaucracy. Two
>> typical Brown Pages that came rattling through the pneumatic tube in
>> December 1944 were number N400,611 about German explosives manufacture,
>> entitled, “Managing Director Dr. Müller complaining about lack of official
>> cooperation from Berlin”; and N400,784 about aircraft production: “Ernst
>> Heinkel Aircraft Works, Vienna, having serious problems getting raw
>> materials for He 219 construction.”
>>
>>
>>
>> There were those who considered such eavesdropping not *korrekt *– somehow
>> ungentlemanly. And often there was a prurient element. When Mussolini paid
>> his first state visit to Berlin
>>
>> in September 1937, an FA team manning the switchboard at Castle
>> Belvedere monitored his calls to his mistress, Clara Petacci. When the duke
>> of Windsor came to Salzburg with his American
>>
>> duchess a month later, Hitler ordered Göring to tap their phones as well.
>>
>>
>>
>> Such tidbits lightened the darker watches of the night at Charlottenburg.
>> A monitor would cry out “*Staatsgesprach!*” (“State talks!”) and throw
>> the switch that poured the intimate
>>
>> conversation into every switchboard in the room. Down the tube came
>> transcripts of the titillating conversations between one of the most
>> eminent Catholic prelates in Berlin and a nun –“Compared with him,”
>> Milch snickered, “Casanova was a wimp!”
>>
>>
>>
>> Göring had ordered General von Schleicher’s phone tapped, of course.
>> “What is it?” the general’s wife was heard teasing a friend. “With an *i
>> *everybody wants to be it. Without an *i*, nobody!”
>>
>>
>>
>> “Give up? *Arisch!*” she triumphed. “Aryan!”
>>
>>
>>
>> Göring read it out to Gestapo Chief Rudolf Diels, roaring with laughter,
>> and ordered the wiretap continued. His Forschungsamt gave to Hitler and his
>> experts a certain deftness, a sureness of touch when they played their
>> diplomatic poker. A French trade mission arrived: An FA “flying squad”
>> took over the switchboard at the Hotel Bristol, monitored even their
>> room-to-room calls, a Brown Page reporting the rock-bottom price they had
>> instructions from home to accept was
>>
>> blow-piped across Berlin to the Ministry of Economics in time for the
>> afternoon’s vital conference. After Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in
>> 1936, Chief Evaluator Seifert took to
>>
>> Hitler the Brown Pages (numbered around N34,500 now) reporting the
>> hysterical foreign-press reaction; Hitler said calmly, “They’ll settle down
>> again.” In 1938 the FA intercepts (numbered
>>
>> around N83,000) would tell him that Britain was not coming to the aid of
>> Austria in March, nor Czechoslovakia in September.
>>
>>
>>
>> The sense of sovereign power that this quiet agency gave to Göring cannot
>> be underestimated. It put him a cut above the rest of Hitler’s henchmen.
>> Noiseless taps were put on the phones of Gauleiter Julius Streicher, the
>> widely disliked gauleiter of Franconia; on Hitler’s female English admirer
>> Unity Mitford; on his talkative adjutant Fritz Wiedemann, and Wiedemann’s
>> globe-trotting girlfriend Princess Stefanie von Hohenlohe; and on
>> Goebbels’s bedmate, the lovely Czech actress Lida Baarova.
>>
>>
>>
>> After obtaining clear proof from the FA of the intrigues of Roosevelt’s
>> ambassadors in Warsaw, Brussels, and Paris, Göring instructed the
>> Forschungsamt department chief Dr. W. Kurzbach
>>
>> to publish a stinging but anonymous exposé in Berlin’s authoritative
>> newspaper, *Börsenzeitung*.
>>
>> Seifert, who often had to deliver the Brown Pages to Göring in person,
>> found him a hard but not unfeeling employer.
>>
>>
>>
>> On the one hand, he had no sense of time or place. He might summon
>> Seifert at dawn to Budapest, then leave him waiting for hours without any
>> breakfast. But, Seifert found, the
>>
>> minister sometimes gained as much pleasure from distributing his growing
>> wealth as from accumulating it. One FA courier could not afford the
>> treatment needed for his child’s infantile
>>
>> paralysis. Seifert wrote a message for Göring on that day’s FA summary,
>> and it came back that night with a scrawled reply: “Of course I shall pick
>> up all the bills.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Once, Seifert took the locked pouch in person to Göring’s new domain,
>> “Carinhall,” in the forests outside Berlin. Göring left him standing in
>> front of the mammoth desk for longer,
>>
>> perhaps, than was polite. As Seifert waited patiently to begin the FA brie
>> fing, he felt something nibbling at his leg: It was a lion cub, its
>> fangs still fortunately petite.
>>
>>
>>
>> “Proceed!” roared Göring enjoying the situation. The lion was a pet that
>> he could openly display; the Forschungsamt, however, was a pet that he
>> could not.
>>
>
>
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