VIRGINIA WHITE BEAR

[Igor Loving]

Bloodied Marines Sound Off About Want of Armor and Men

By MICHAEL MOSS
n May 29, 2004, a station wagon that Iraqi insurgents had packed with C-4 
explosives blew up on a highway in Ramadi, killing four American marines who 
died for lack of a few inches of steel.

The four were returning to camp in an unarmored Humvee that their unit had 
rigged with scrap metal, but the makeshift shields rose only as high as 
their shoulders, photographs of the Humvee show, and the shrapnel from the 
bomb shot over the top.

"The steel was not high enough," said Staff Sgt. Jose S. Valerio, their 
motor transport chief, who along with the unit's commanding officers said 
the men would have lived had their vehicle been properly armored. "Most of 
the shrapnel wounds were to their heads."

Among those killed were Rafael Reynosa, a 28-year-old lance corporal from 
Santa Ana, Calif., whose wife was expecting twins, and Cody S. Calavan, a 
19-year-old private first class from Lake Stevens, Wash., who had the Marine 
Corps motto, Semper Fidelis, tattooed across his back.

They were not the only losses for Company E during its six-month stint last 
year in Ramadi. In all, more than one-third of the unit's 185 troops were 
killed or wounded, the highest casualty rate of any company in the war, 
Marine Corps officials say.

In returning home, the leaders and Marine infantrymen have chosen to break 
an institutional code of silence and tell their story, one they say was 
punctuated not only by a lack of armor, but also by a shortage of men and 
planning that further hampered their efforts in battle, destroyed morale and 
ruined the careers of some of their fiercest warriors.

The saga of Company E, part of a lionized battalion nicknamed the 
Magnificent Bastards, is also one of fortitude and ingenuity. The marines, 
based at Camp Pendleton in southern California, had been asked to rid the 
provincial capital of one of the most persistent insurgencies, and in 
enduring 26 firefights, 90 mortar attacks and more than 90 homemade bombs, 
they shipped their dead home and powered on. Their tour has become legendary 
among other Marine units now serving in Iraq and facing some of the same 
problems.

"As marines, we are always taught that we do more with less," said Sgt. 
James S. King, a platoon sergeant who lost his left leg when he was blown 
out of the Humvee that Saturday afternoon last May. "And get the job done no 
matter what it takes."

The experiences of Company E's marines, pieced together through interviews 
at Camp Pendleton and by phone, company records and dozens of photographs 
taken by the marines, show they often did just that. The unit had less than 
half the troops who are now doing its job in Ramadi, and resorted to making 
dummy marines from cardboard cutouts and camouflage shirts to place in 
observation posts on the highway when it ran out of men. During one of its 
deadliest firefights, it came up short on both vehicles and troops. Marines 
who were stranded at their camp tried in vain to hot-wire a dump truck to 
help rescue their falling brothers. That day, 10 men in the unit died.

Sergeant Valerio and others had to scrounge for metal scraps to strengthen 
the Humvees they inherited from the National Guard, which occupied Ramadi 
before the marines arrived. Among other problems, the armor the marines 
slapped together included heavier doors that could not be latched, so they 
"chicken winged it" by holding them shut with their arms as they traveled.

"We were sitting out in the open, an easy target for everybody," Cpl. Toby 
G. Winn of Centerville, Tex., said of the shortages. "We complained about it 
every day, to anybody we could. They told us they were listening, but we 
didn't see it."

The company leaders say it is impossible to know how many lives may have 
been saved through better protection, since the insurgents became adept at 
overcoming improved defenses with more powerful weapons. Likewise, Pentagon 
officials say they do not know how many of the more than 1,500 American 
troops who have died in the war had insufficient protective gear.

But while most of Company E's work in fighting insurgents was on foot, the 
biggest danger the men faced came in traveling to and from camp: 13 of the 
21 men who were killed had been riding in Humvees that failed to deflect 
bullets or bombs.

Toward the end of their tour when half of their fleet had become 
factory-armored, the armor's worth became starkly clear. A car bomb that the 
unit's commander, Capt. Kelly D. Royer, said was at least as powerful as the 
one on May 29 showered a fully armored Humvee with shrapnel, photographs 
show. The marines inside were left nearly unscathed.

Captain Royer, from Orangevale, Calif., would not accompany his troops home. 
He was removed from his post six days before they began leaving Ramadi, 
accused by his superiors of being dictatorial, records show. His defenders 
counter that his commanding style was a necessary response to the extreme 
circumstances of his unit's deployment.

Company E's experiences still resonate today both in Iraq, where two more 
marines were killed last week in Ramadi by the continuing insurgency, and in 
Washington, where Congress is still struggling to solve the Humvee problem. 
Just on Thursday, the Senate voted to spend an extra $213 million to buy 
more fully armored Humvees. The Army's procurement system, which also 
supplies the Marines, has come under fierce criticism for underperforming in 
the war, and to this day it has only one small contractor in Ohio armoring 
new Humvees.

Marine Corps officials disclosed last month in Congressional hearings that 
they were now going their own way and had undertaken a crash program to 
equip all of their more than 2,800 Humvees in Iraq with stronger armor. The 
effort went into production in November and is to be completed at the end of 
this year.

Defense Department officials acknowledged that Company E lacked enough 
equipment and men, but said that those were problems experienced by many 
troops when the insurgency intensified last year, and that vigorous efforts 
had been made to improve their circumstances.

Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis of Richland, Wash., who commanded the First Marine 
Division to which Company E belongs, said he had taken every possible step 
to support Company E. He added that they had received more factory-armored 
Humvees than any other unit in Iraq.

"We could not encase men in sufficiently strong armor to deny any enemy 
success," General Mattis said. "The tragic loss of our men does not 
necessarily indicate failure - it is war."

Trouble From the Start

Company E's troubles began at Camp Pendleton when, just seven days before 
the unit left for Iraq, it lost its first commander. The captain who led 
them through training was relieved for reasons his supervisor declined to 
discuss.

"That was like losing your quarterback on game day," said First Sgt. Curtis 
E. Winfree.

In Kuwait, where the unit stopped over, an 18-year-old private committed 
suicide in a chapel. Then en route to Ramadi, they lost the few armored 
plates they had earmarked for their vehicles when the steel was borrowed by 
another unit that failed to return it. Company E tracked the steel down and 
took it back.

Even at that, the armor was mostly just scrap and thin, and they needed more 
for the unarmored Humvees they inherited from the Florida National Guard.

"It was pitiful," said Capt. Chae J. Han, a member of a Pentagon team that 
surveyed the Marine camps in Iraq last year to document their condition. 
"Everything was just slapped on armor, just homemade, not armor that was 
given to us through the normal logistical system."

The report they produced was classified, but Captain Royer, who took over 
command of the unit, and other Company E marines say they had to build 
barriers at the camp - a former junkyard - to block suicide drivers, improve 
the fencing and move the toilets under a thick roof to avoid the insurgent 
shelling.

Even some maps they were given to plan raids were several years old, showing 
farmland where in fact there were homes, said a company intelligence expert, 
Cpl. Charles V. Lauersdorf, who later went to work for the Defense 
Intelligence Agency. There, he discovered up-to-date imagery that had not 
found its way to the front lines.

Ramadi had been quiet under the National Guard, but the Marines had orders 
to root out an insurgency that was using the provincial capital as a way 
station to Falluja and Baghdad, said Lt. Col. Paul J. Kennedy, who oversaw 
Company E as the commander of its Second Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment.

Before the company's first month was up, Lance Cpl. William J. Wiscowiche of 
Victorville, Calif., lay dead on the main highway as its first casualty. The 
Marine Corps issued a statement saying only that he had died in action. But 
for Company E, it was the first reality check on the constraints that would 
mark their tour.

Sweeping for Bombs

A British officer had taught them to sweep the roads for bombs by boxing off 
sections and fanning out troops into adjoining neighborhoods in hopes of 
scaring away insurgents poised to set off the bombs. "We didn't have the 
time to do that," said Sgt. Charles R. Sheldon of Solana Beach, Calif. "We 
had to clear this long section of highway, and it usually took us all day."

Now and then a Humvee would speed through equipped with an electronic device 
intended to block detonation of makeshift bombs. The battalion, which had 
five companies in its fold, had only a handful of the devices, Colonel 
Kennedy said.

Company E had none, even though sweeping roads for bombs was one of its main 
duties. So many of the marines, like Corporal Wiscowiche, had to rely on 
their eyes. On duty on March 30, 2004, the 20-year-old lance corporal did 
not spot the telltale three-inch wires sticking out of the dust until he was 
a few feet away, the company's leaders say. He died when the bomb was set 
off.

"We had just left the base," Corporal Winn said. "He was walking in the 
middle of the road, and all I remember is hearing a big explosion and seeing 
a big cloud of smoke."

The endless task of walking the highways for newly hidden I.E.D.'s, or 
improvised explosive devices, "was nerve wracking," Corporal Winn said, and 
the company began using binoculars and the scopes on their rifles to spot 
the bombs after Corporal Wiscowiche was killed.

"Halfway through the deployment marines began getting good at spotting 
little things," Sergeant Sheldon added. "We had marines riding down the road 
at 60 miles an hour, and they would spot a copper filament sticking out of a 
block of cement."

General Mattis said troops in the area now have hundreds of the electronic 
devices to foil the I.E.D.'s.

In parceling out Ramadi, the Marine Corps leadership gave Company E more 
than 10 square miles to control, far more than the battalion's other 
companies. Captain Royer said he had informally asked for an extra platoon, 
or 44 marines, and had been told the battalion was seeking an extra company. 
The battalion's operations officer, Maj. John D. Harrill, said the battalion 
had received sporadic assistance from the Army and had given Company E extra 
help. General Mattis says he could not pull marines from another part of 
Iraq because "there were tough fights going on everywhere."

Colonel Kennedy said Company E's area was less dense, but the pressure it 
put on the marines came to a boil on April 6, 2004, when the company had to 
empty its camp - leaving the cooks to guard the gates - to deal with three 
firefights.

Ten of its troops were killed that day, including eight who died when the 
Humvee they were riding in was ambushed en route to assist other marines 
under fire. That Humvee lacked even the improvised steel on the back where 
most of the marines sat, Company E leaders say.

"All I saw was sandbags, blood and dead bodies," Sergeant Valerio said. 
"There was no protection in the back."

Captain Royer said more armor would not have even helped. The insurgents had 
a .50-caliber machine gun that punched huge holes through its windshield. 
Only a heavier combat vehicle could have withstood the barrage, he said, but 
the unit had none. Defense Department officials have said they favored 
Humvees over tanks in Iraq because they were less imposing to civilians.

The Humvee that trailed behind that day, which did have improvised armor, 
was hit with less powerful munitions, and the marines riding in it survived 
by hunkering down. "The rounds were pinging," Sergeant Sheldon said. "Then 
in a lull they returned fire and got out."

Captain Royer said that he photographed the Humvees in which his men died to 
show to any official who asked about the condition of their armor, but that 
no one ever did.

Sergeant Valerio redoubled his effort to fortify the Humvees by begging 
other branches of the military for scraps. "How am I going to leave those 
kids out there in those Humvees," he recalled asking himself.

The company of 185 marines had only two Humvees and three trucks when it 
arrived, so just getting them into his shop was a logistical chore, Sergeant 
Valerio said. He also worried that the steel could come loose in a blast and 
become deadly shrapnel.

For the gunners who rode atop, Sergeant Valerio stitched together 
bulletproof shoulder pads into chaps to protect their legs.

"That guy was amazing," First Sgt. Bernard Coleman said. "He was under a 
vehicle when a mortar landed, and he caught some in the leg. When the mortar 
fire stopped, he went right back to work."

A Captain's Fate

Lt. Sean J. Schickel remembers Captain Royer asking a high-ranking Marine 
Corps visitor whether the company would be getting more factory-armored 
Humvees. The official said they had not been requested and that there were 
production constraints, Lieutenant Schickel said.

Recalls Captain Royer: "I'm thinking we have our most precious resource 
engaged in combat, and certainly the wealth of our nation can provide young, 
selfless men with what they need to accomplish their mission. That's an 
erudite way of putting it. I have a much more guttural response that I won't 
give you."

Captain Royer was later relieved of command. General Mattis and Colonel 
Kennedy declined to discuss the matter. His first fitness report, issued on 
May 31, 2004, after the company's deadliest firefights, concluded, "He has 
single-handedly reshaped a company in sore need of a leader; succeeded in 
forming a cohesive fighting force that is battle-tested and worthy."

The second, on Sept. 1, 2004, gave him opposite marks for leadership. "He 
has been described on numerous occasions as 'dictatorial,' " it said. "There 
is no morale or motivation in his marines." His defenders say he drove his 
troops as hard as he drove himself, but was wrongly blamed for problems like 
armor. "Captain Royer was a decent man that was used for a dirty job and 
thrown away by his chain of command," Sergeant Sheldon said.

Today, Captain Royer is at Camp Pendleton contesting his fitness report, 
which could force him to retire. Company E is awaiting deployment to 
Okinawa, Japan. Some members have moved to other units, or are leaving the 
Marines altogether.

"I'm checking out," Corporal Winn said. "When I started, I wanted to make it 
my career. I've had enough."



Aloha:
Igor



>From: "Jim Baldauf" <jfbaldauf at prodigy.net>
>Reply-To: survivors' reminiscences about Austin Ghetto Daze in the 60s 
<austin-ghetto-list at pairlist.net>
>To: "survivors' reminiscences about Austin Ghetto Daze in the 
60s" <austin-ghetto-list at pairlist.net>,"Remembrances of 
Austin Ghetto" <GHETTO2 at LISTS.WHATHELPS.COM>
>Subject: Re: VIRGINIA WHITE BEAR
>Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 11:59:22 -0500
>
>Please don't cook Pogo!
>
>Jim Bob
>   ----- Original Message -----
>   From: Clark Santos
>   To: Remembrances of Austin Ghetto ; survivors' reminiscences about 
Austin Ghetto Daze in the 60s
>   Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 11:22 AM
>   Subject: VIRGINIA WHITE BEAR
>
>
>   Mowing my yard this morning I feared being pounced upon by a mighty
>   Virginia Bear, then I decided he was a DeLay republican and might 
taste good
>   with tatters at the ghetto reonion....
>
>   EL PATRON.
>
>
>
>
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>   VIRGINIA BEAR
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>   LOOKING FOR SUNFLOWERS
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>   POSUM AN TATTERS
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